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Abstract
The protection of fundamental rights may, in addition to the
primary obligation for states to refrain from interfering with an individual’s rights,
require positive action to be undertaken by public authorities. The development of
positive obligations is well known from the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECrtHR). Could such a development also take place within the case law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), considering that it must protect
the same range of fundamental rights? If so, in which areas of European Union (EU)
law does this occur? And how does this relate to the limits that have been placed on
the protection of fundamental rights by the EU, especially on the basis of the principle
of attributed powers? This article aims to discuss various procedural as well as some
material positive obligations, which have been developed in the case law of the CJEU,
that also amount to certain positive obligations. It will be examined how these obliga-
tions relate to the various limits laid down in EU law, particularly those which aim
to prevent the expansion of EU powers. While there is a certain basis laid down in
EU law for imposing procedural as well as material positive obligations, this article
suggests that the CJEU may further draw inspiration from the case law of the ECrtHR
in dealing with this concept.
1 Introduction
From the perspective of European Union (hereinafter: EU)
law there exists a certain fear concerning the obligations that may arise from
the protection of fundamental rights. Within the EU Charter (hereinafter: CFR)
and within the context of the accession of the EU to the European Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECHR), it has been heavily emphasised that
the protection of fundamental rights may not go beyond or expand the powers
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of the EU.1 The fear of the expansion of EU powers in this area stems to a certain
extent from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter:
the ECrtHR) which has interpreted fundamental rights in such a way as to not
only require states to abstain from interfering in those rights, but they may also
require states to fulfil certain positive obligations to ensure the effective protec-
tion of those rights.2 On the basis of this approach, the ECrtHR has concluded
in M.S.S., and more recently in Tarakhel, that states parties may be required to
undertake some action to ensure that asylum seekers do not face treatment
which is contrary to the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment upon their return to another Member State of the EU.3 As is widely
known, these rulings of the ECrtHR have direct effects for the obligations of
the Member States of the EU under the Dublin Regulation, which in principle
requires asylum seekers to be sent back to the Member State where they first
arrived in the EU.4 This Regulation is based on the principle of mutual recog-
nition. In relation to areas which are governed by the principle of mutual rec-
ognition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: the CJEU)
has held that ‘save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other
Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the EU.’5 From this assertion it could be implied that there is
very little room for the Member States to fulfil any active requirements to ensure
the effective protection of fundamental rights. It is questionable whether such
an approach is tenable in view of the case law of the ECrtHR. Moreover, it actu-
ally stands in contrast with the CJEU’s rather more active approach towards
fundamental rights in some other fields of EU law – a contrast this article spe-
cifically aims to show.
See in particular Art. 51(2) CFR and Art. 6(2) Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU).1
See in general A.R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 2004); and
2
D. Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights
(London: Routledge 2012).
ECrtHR 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/06, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece; and ECrtHR 4
November 2014, appl. no. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland. See for an elaborate analysis of
3
the positive obligations which the EU could incur in this context after accession to the ECHR:
C. Stubberfield, ‘Lifting the Organisational Veil: Positive Obligations of the European Union
Following Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’, Australian International
Law Journal 19 (2012), p. 117-142; and section 5 of this article.
(as currently in force:) Regulation No 604/2013/EU establishing the criteria and mechanisms
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international
4
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person,
OJ [2013] L 180/31.
CJEU 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/14, par. 191-194. In previous judgments on this matter, the
CJEU also did not clarify if the Member States would incur any specific active requirements
5
on the basis of fundamental rights, see CJEU 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and
C-493/10, N.S. and Others; CJEU 10 December 2014, Case C-394/12, Abdullahi; CJEU 14
November 2013, Case C-4/11, Puid; and CJEU 6 November 2013, Case C-245/11, K.
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This article will discuss how the CJEU itself has relied on fundamental rights
to create new obligations for the Member States and has gone beyond what is
specifically provided for by (secondary) EU law. The CJEU has especially been
willing to actively guide the remedies and powers that need to be provided by
national courts to ensure the effective application of EU law. Increasingly, the
case law of the CJEU also provides procedural obligations which must be fulfilled
by administrative authorities, and even some material obligations. In the case
of Abdida, the CJEU decided that Member States must adopt interim measures,
as well as provide for the basic needs of a seriously ill third-country national
awaiting the appeal to a decision to return on the basis of the non-
refoulement principle.6 The case law of the CJEU has also revealed, albeit in very
few situations, that even some legislative changes may be needed in order to
protect fundamental rights.
The objective of this article is to provide some suggestions on how the CJEU
could legitimately ensure the effective protection of fundamental rights within
its case law. Attention is paid to several important limits, which have been laid
down within EU law itself, as well as to criticisms that have been expressed to-
wards the development of positive obligations in the case law of the ECrtHR.
This article will approach the foregoing matters in the following order: First,
some further insight will be provided into what positive obligations, as defined
by the ECrtHR, actually entail (section 2). Thereafter, the particular development
of positive obligations in the case law of the CJEU will be discussed (section 3).
By looking at several limitations which have been laid down in EU law, the
analysis then aims to determine when the development of such obligations ac-
tually raises tensions under EU law (section 4). Subsequently it will be discussed
how the case law of the ECrtHR could provide helpful principles, which may
be used by the CJEU, in order to deal with the development of its own positive
obligations (section 5). The main conclusions of this article will be set forth in
the last section (section 6).
2 The Development of Positive Obligations by the
ECrtHR
Positive obligations have been developed by the ECrtHR in
relation to nearly all of the (predominantly) civil and political rights of the
Convention.7 Some of its most renowned obligations include the obligation for
states parties to undertake independent and effective investigations into infringe-
CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 59-62.6
For a provision-based overview of the development of positive obligations within the ECHR,
see Mowbray (2004); and for a more critical analysis of the theory of positive obligations as
developed by the ECrtHR see Xenos (2012), supra n. 2.
7
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ments of the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR);8 the obligation to grant legal aid to
ensure an effective right of access to court (Art. 6 ECHR);9 and the obligation
to provide for legal recognition of one’s family ties or one’s sexual identity on
the basis of the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8 ECHR).10 These
obligations have been read into the Convention by the ECrtHR on a case-by-
case basis as obligations which arise ‘in addition to the primary negative under-
taking which follows from the [ECHR]’.11 The ECrtHR does not provide an
elaborate definition of the concept of positive obligations. The great variety of
positive obligations, which are now contained in its case law, demonstrate that
it concerns obligations which may arise for states parties to protect individuals
from infringements that can be caused by their own state agents, by private
parties or in relation to the vulnerabilities or the social inequality of particular
(groups of) individuals such as detainees, disabled persons, and asylum seekers.12
Positive obligations cannot be derived from the text of the Convention, but
are implied by the ECrtHR on the basis of the general obligation which states
have agreed to under Article 1 ECHR to secure the Convention’s rights and
freedoms to individuals falling within their jurisdiction. In addition, the ECrtHR
refers to the principle of effective protection of fundamental rights as a basis
for the development of positive obligations, which requires fundamental rights
protection not to become illusory but remain practical and effective. Also, Article
13 ECHR constitutes an important basis for the development of procedural ob-
ligations as it requires states to provide for effective remedies in relation to vio-
lations of the rights of the Convention.13 The incorporation of positive obligations
into the ECHR has extended the fundamental rights obligations beyond the
sphere of rights that states parties had knowingly and willingly contracted
themselves to respect under the ECHR and have, to a certain extent, imposed
burdensome obligations for states parties in organisational and financial terms.14
Generally the recognition of these obligations implies a more active role for the
states parties in respect of the protection of fundamental rights requiring the
domestic legislature to introduce or amend its laws, the executive to devise
See ECrtHR 27 September 1995, appl. no. 18984/91, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom,
par. 161; ECrtHR 30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, par. 65; and
ECrtHR 9 April 2009, appl. no. 71463/01, Case of Šilih v. Slovenia, par. 154 and 159.
8
See ECrtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland, par. 32-33.9
See e.g. ECrtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium, par. 31; and ECrtHR 11
July 2002, appl. no. 28957/95, Case of Christina Goodwin v. the United Kingdom.
10
See e.g. ECrtHR, judgment of 28 May 1985, appl. nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81, Case of Abdulaziz,
Balkandali and Cabales v. the United Kingdom, par. 67.
11
See further Xenos (2012), supra n. 2, p. 141-172.12
See e.g. ECrtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium, par. 31.13
See P. van Dijk, ‘“Positive Obligations” Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights:
Are States Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’, in: P. Baehr, M. Castermans-Holleman &
14
G. van Hoof (eds), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century (The Hague: Kluwer Law In-
ternational 1998), p. 17.
Review of European Administrative Law 2015-2130
BEIJER
special procedures and for national courts to interpret national law in accordance
with the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights.15
Perhaps in response to the criticism, which has been expressed by scholars
as well as by judges of the ECrtHR itself,16 the ECrtHR increasingly provides
more clear indications as to the positive obligations which states parties may
incur under the ECHR by clarifying the methodological choices which it makes
to develop these obligations and by introducing several limitations as to the
scope of the positive obligations which may arise under the Convention.17 By
refining its positive obligations, the ECrtHR is to some extent limiting the
powers of states at national level even further. However, it also increases the
legal certainty and foreseeability for states in respect of the obligations which
they may expect to incur, and for individuals in respect of the claims which they
may expect to find covered by the Convention. The case law of the ECrtHR
continues to develop with substantially newer positive obligations in such fields
as the environment and in relation to human trafficking.18 Some of its positive
obligations have even appeared to be of direct relevance for the protection of
fundamental rights in areas of EU law, such as the example of the Dublin returns
(explained in the introduction of this article) demonstrates.19
Where the effective protection of fundamental rights within the scope of
EU would indeed require the CJEU to define certain positive obligations, the
CJEU may want to take into account the development of positive obligations in
the case law of the ECrtHR. Especially, where such positive obligations are
directly relevant to areas of EU law. The CJEU may also wish to have regard to
the conceptual framework surrounding the concept of positive obligations and
See e.g. ECrtHR 13 July 2004, appl. no. 69498/01, Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, par. 62.15
See e.g. the critiques of former judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion to ECrtHR 13 June
1979, appl. no. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium; and more recently P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen,
16
Repressie door mensenrechten: over positieve verplichtingen tot aanwending van strafrecht ter bescher-
ming van fundamentele rechten [Repression by human rights: On positive obligations to apply crim-
inal law to ensure fundamental rights] (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2008).
See e.g. Xenos (2012), supra n. 2; and L. Lavrysen, ‘The scope of rights and the scope of obliga-
tions: positive obligations’, in: E. Brems & J.H. Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The
17
Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2014), p. 162-182. Recently the ECrtHR has also provided a list
with indicators that should determine the scope of positive obligations under the Convention,
see ECrtHR 16 July 2014, appl. no. 37359/09, Hämäläinen v. Finland (recognition of gender
reassignment within the scope of marriage); and ECrtHR 29 January 2014, appl. no. 35810/09,
O’Keeffe v. Ireland (protection of children from sexual abuse in an education context).
See e.g. ECrtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, Fadayeva v. Russia; and ECrtHR 7 January
2010, appl. no. 25965/04, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia; and ECrtHR 6 November 2011, appl.
18
no. 47335/06, Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, par. 42-43. See further C. Dröge, Positive Ver-
pflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Berlin: Springer 2003),
p. 3.
The ECrtHR has also developed the obligation for national courts to provide motivations when
they decide not to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, see ECrtHR 8 April
2014, appl. no. 17120/09, Dhahbi v. Italy.
19
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the criticisms that may be expressed towards the development of such obliga-
tions.
3 Active Guidance of Fundamental Rights Protection
by the CJEU: Developing Positive Obligations?
Within the context of EU law, fundamental rights are often
primarily regarded as limits to the exercise of powers by the EU institutions
and the Member States based on EU law, rather than as a basis for giving rise
to any new obligations.20 In contrast to the approach of the ECrtHR, the CJEU’s
fundamental rights jurisdiction is limited to interpreting provisions or acts of
(secondary) EU law in light of fundamental rights and to determine the validity
thereof. Therefore, it would seem as if only negative obligations to protect fun-
damental rights could be set forth in the case law of the CJEU.21 Yet, fundamental
rights have in several respects also been used by the CJEU as a basis for defining
obligations to take further actions beyond what is (specifically) required by
provisions of EU law, giving rise to certain active measures that must be fulfilled
by the Member States.
Firstly, to ensure the effective application of EU law at the national level,
the CJEU has quite actively shaped certain judicial remedies and powers which
must be provided for before the national courts. While in principle EU law relies
on the national framework of procedural law if no specific requirements are
laid down in EU secondary law, it has become clear in certain judicial disputes
that the Member States may need to make new arrangements to provide effective
protection of EU law. On several occasions, the CJEU has clarified that judicial
remedies need to be made available to allow individuals to challenge infringe-
ments of certain rights, which they may incur under EU (secondary) law, that
could be caused either by public authorities or by private parties.22 The CJEU
has also established that individuals must be able to claim damages before their
national courts caused by Member States’ failure to implement EU law cor-
Cf. further S. Besson, ‘European Human Rights, Supranational Judicial Review and Democracy:
Thinking outside the judicial box’ in: P. Populier & C. van de Heijning (eds), Human rights
20
protection in the European Legal Order: The Interaction between the European and National Courts
(Cambridge: Intersentia 2011), p. 97-145.
See e.g. CJEU 17 December 1970, Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, par. 3-4. Cf.
further O. De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through
21
the Open Method of Coordination’, Jean Monnet Working paper 07/04, p. 4; and T. Ahmed &
I. de Jesús Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights Review: An International Law
Perspective’, European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), p. 771-801.
See CJEU 15 May 1986, Case C-222/84, Johnston, par. 17-19 (right to equal treatment); CJEU 15
October 1987, Case C-222/86, Heylens (free movement of workers), par. 14; CJEU 27 March
22
2014, Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien (freedom of information of internet users), par. 57;
and CJEU 17 September 2014, Case C-562/12, Liivimaa Lihaveis (refusal to grant EU subsidies).
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rectly.23 Seized with disputes concerning EU law, national courts must further-
more be able to dispose over several (far-reaching) powers. According to the
CJEU, national courts must interpret national law in conformity with funda-
mental rights that are protected under EU law,24 be able to set aside a national
legal provision that is regarded to be in conflict therewith25 and be able to order
interim measures.26 By indicating quite clearly which remedies and powers
must be made available, several scholars have concluded, in respect of these
cases, that the CJEU has in fact imposed positive obligations on the Member
States.27 These remedies and powers must also be applied to protect the principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of age (as given further expression by EU
law)28 and the rights of asylum seekers or third-country nationals who seek to
challenge decisions concerning a transfer back to another Member State.29 In
this context as well, the CJEU has specifically required national courts to use
special techniques and special rules, which would allow them to review the le-
gality of removal decisions (when based on reasons of state security), and even
to be able to set an administrative decision aside and to substitute that decision
by ordering alternative measures.30
Secondly, the case law of the CJEU increasingly reveals obligations for the
administrative authorities that must be undertaken on the basis of fundamental
rights. The CJEU has clarified in relation to several types of decisions taken by
public authorities, in areas such as tax law, customs law, asylum and immigra-
tion law, that individuals must be heard before decisions are taken that may
adversely affect their interests, and that decisions must be sufficiently reasoned
See CJEU 19 November 1991, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy;
CJEU 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10, Dominguez, par. 43; and 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12,
Association de médiation sociale, par. 50.
23
See CJEU 26 June 2007, Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophone and germanophone and
Others, par. 28; and Case C-275/06, Promusicae, par. 68 and 70.
24
See CJEU 19 November 1991, Case C-6/90, Francovich, par. 31-37; and CJEU 16 February 2012,
Case C-182/10, Solvay, par. 49. In horizontal disputes see CJEU 22 November 2005, Case
25
C-144/04, Mangold, par. 77; CJEU 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, par. 51; CJEU
25 July 1991, Case C-208/90, Emmott, par. 21-23.
See CJEU 19 June 1990, Case C-213/89, Factortame, par. 18-22; CJEU 13 March 2007, Case
C-432/05, Unibet, par. 67; and CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 50.
26
See S. Prechal & R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness”
and Effective Judicial Protection’, Review of European Administrative Law 4 (2011/1), p. 31-50,
27
p. 40-43 and 47-49; and P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Confusing Constitutional Status of
Positive Procedural Obligations in EU law’, Review of European Administrative Law 5 (2012/1),
p. 81-100.
See CJEU 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold, par. 77; CJEU 19 January 2010, Case
C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, par. 51.
28
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 50.29
See CJEU 4 June 2013, Case C-300/11, ZZ, par. 57-58; and CJEU 5 June 2014, Case C-146/14
PPU, Mahdi, par. 62.
30
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so to allow those individuals to challenge the said decisions.31 Sometimes the
CJEU leaves little discretion to the Member States and may even expressly
prescribe the new procedures that need to be undertaken or laid down by law
to comply with the announced positive obligations.32 The CJEU has moreover
determined, as was indicated in the introduction, that Member States may need
to make provisions for the basic needs of a third-country national who suffers
from a particularly serious illness while awaiting the appeal of a transfer de-
cision. Arguably, such obligations had not been expressly provided for under
the applicable instrument of EU legislation.33 Thereby, the CJEU has thus gone
beyond clarifying obligations of a merely procedural nature.
The CJEU has also developed several procedural obligations to be fulfilled
by the EU institutions. In the Kadi judgments, the CJEU has taken a bold move
by exercising full judicial review of measures, which were essentially taken on
the basis of a Security Council Resolution, to freeze the funds of persons and
entities who are associated to terrorist organisations and activities.34 The CJEU
thereby clarified that EU authorities must ensure that the person and entities
subject to the sanctions are informed of the grounds for their placement on
that list and that they are allowed to make their views known within a reasonable
time after placement on the list.35 In addition, also the General Court has estab-
lished in the case of LTTE v. Council, that the Council must, when basing a
decision to freeze the funds of a terrorist organisation on a decision of a third
country, first examine whether the rights of the defence and the right to effective
judicial protection are equivalent to the level of fundamental rights guaranteed
by the EU.36 Essentially these obligations that require (particular) procedures
to be followed are all judge-made.
Thirdly, although very exceptionally, the CJEU has imposed an obligation
directly to undertake legislative action. In the case of Chatzi, the CJEU estab-
On the right to be heard, see CJEU 22 November 2012, Case C-277/11, M., par. 81; CJEU 18
December 2008, Case C-349/07, Sopropé, par. 36-37; and CJEU 3 July 2014, Case C-129/13,
31
Kamino International Logistics, par. 31-34. On the obligation for courts to motivate their decisions,
see CJEU 15 October 1987, Case C-222/86, Heylens, par. 15; CJEU Case C-300/11, ZZ, par. 65;
CJEU 17 July 2014, Case C-372/12, Y. and S., par. 66-67; and CJEU 22 November 2012, Case
C-277/11, M., par. 88.
CJEU 5 November 2014, Case C-166/13, Mukarubega, par. 62; and CJEU 11 December 2014,
Case C-249/13, Boudjlida, par. 55-56.
32
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 59-62. See further section 4.2 of this
article.
33
CJEU 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat In-
ternational Foundation/ Council and Commission; and CJEU 18 July 2013, Case C-584/13 P,
Commission and Others v. Kadi.
34
See CJEU 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation/ Council and Commission, par. 336-337 and 348; See further A. Cuyvers,
35
‘“Give me one good reason”: the unified standard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’, Common
Market Law Review 51 (2014), p. 1759-1788.
See General Court 16 October 2014, T-208/11, LTTE v. Council, par. 138-139 and 210-212.36
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lished that the national legislature must take measures to ensure that it estab-
lishes a parental leave regime, which ensures that the parents of twins receive
treatment that takes due account of their particular needs.37 This obligation had
not been specifically provided for under the applicable EU Parental Leave Direc-
tive, which only required Member States to meet certain minimum standards.38
In combination, the case law of the CJEU thus includes already a (small)
variety of judicial, administrative and legislative obligations requiring Member
States, as well as the EU institutions to undertake particular action on the basis
of fundamental rights. Action that does not follow from very specific or explicit
provisions of EU law itself.
4 Limits to Positive Obligations Flowing from EU
Law
In what respect should the establishment of the obligations,
discussed in the previous section, actually be considered problematic? Admit-
tedly, it concerns obligations which are much less far-reaching as compared to
some of the positive obligations which have been established by the ECrtHR.39
Moreover, there is often, at least partly, a basis for imposing such obligations
to be found in secondary EU law in combination with provisions of fundamental
rights. Some of the measures which have been specified by the CJEU (e.g. the
provision of a remedy, and the obligation to provide for hearings) can also log-
ically be derived from the specific fundamental right(s) itself. Since the entry
into force of the CFR, such requirements have even been clearly laid down in
primary EU law (see in particular Arts. 41 and 47 CFR).
The development of positive obligations could nevertheless be problematic
within the context of EU law if it conflicts with Article 51(2) CFR. This provision
holds that:
‘The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond
the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or
modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’
The limits related to the principle of attributed powers are clearly stressed
in the specific context of the CFR, even though such limits are already generally
See CJEU 16 September 2010, Case C-149/10, Chatzi, par. 68 and 75.37
Clause 2(1) of the annex to Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework
agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1996 L 145/24.
38
Cf. e.g. the case of Öneryildiz in which the ECrtHR clarified that the state has a positive obligation
to regulate dangerous activities on the basis of the protection of the right to life, see ECrtHR
30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99, Öneryildiz.
39
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seen in Article 5 TEU.40 Since there is a particular fear that the powers of the
EU will expand due to the protection of fundamental rights, it must be ensured
that the principle of attributed powers is indeed respected.41 This could raise
particular difficulties for accepting positive obligations, especially if they give
rise to new powers to act.42 Article 51(2) would especially seem to preclude the
creation of any new legislative obligations.43 The Member States have not attrib-
uted a general power to the EU to take actions to protect fundamental rights.44
It has been argued, however, that fundamental rights protection can still be
provided on the basis of an ‘indirect’ or ‘accessory’ power.45 After all, the EU
must ensure that fundamental rights are respected within the exercise of all of
its powers. This would imply that there is an indirect power for the EU to be
able to comply with any negative, as well as positive, obligations which funda-
mental rights may give rise to. Such an indirect power must, however, closely
follow the limits and the scope of another power that has explicitly been attrib-
uted to the EU (such as in the area of asylum law). It must also be ensured that
such an indirect power indeed remains ‘accessory’ to the explicit power to which
it is related.46 The CJEU must be mindful of these limits when interpreting
and applying fundamental rights.
In relation to this, the CJEU must also respect the limited scope of application
of the fundamental rights laid down in the CFR when developing any active
requirements. EU fundamental rights standards and requirements may only
be imposed on the EU institutions and on the Member States when they imple-
ment EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) CFR. Again, it is stated in this
The expansion of the powers of the EU constitutes a concern that is more broadly discussed,
see e.g. P. Craig, ‘Competence: clarity, conferral, containment and consideration’, European
Law Review 29 (2004), p. 323-344.
40
In addition see Art. 1(3) of the Draft Agreement and the explanatory report, 47+1(2013)008rev2,
at www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/
41
47_1%282013%29008rev2_EN.pdf (last consulted on 29 June 2015); and Art. 2 of Protocol,
no. 8 TEU.
For a discussion on the implications following from Art.51 CFR for a development of positive
obligations, see in particular A. Heringa & L. Verhey, ‘The EU Charter: Text and Structure’,
42
Maastricht Journal 8 (2001), p. 19-20; and J. van der Velde, ‘The Protection of Fundamental
Rights within the European Union – a historical approach’ in: J. Wouter, L. Verhey & P. Kiiver
(eds), European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Antwerp: Intersentia 2009), p. 74-78.
Yet, as will be discussed later on, a ‘competence creep’ could occur in a quite subtle way, i.e.
by the extension of the scope of EU law, see S. Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General
Principles of Law’, Review of European Administrative Law 3 (2010), p. 5-22.
43
Yet, the existence of powers in some specific fields may be accepted, see Art. 16(2) (protection
of personal data); Art. 19 (non-discrimination on different grounds); and Art. 157(3) TFEU
(principle of equal treatment of women and men).
44
See P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’, Common
Market Law Review 39 (2002), p. 983; Besson (2011), supra n. 20, p. 44-45; and E. Muir, ‘The
45
Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges’, Common
Market Law Review 51 (2014), p. 226.
See Eeckhout (2002), supra n. 45, p. 983.46
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provision that the EU institutions and the Member States must ‘respect the
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance
with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the
Union as conferred on it in the Treaties’.47 The CJEU has arguably given quite
a broad interpretation of when Member States’ action amounts to the ‘imple-
mentation of EU law’. It has held in the Åkerberg Fransson case that the CFR
applies ‘where national legislation falls within the scope of Union law’.48 Thus
the protection of fundamental rights based on the CFR may not go beyond the
(legislative) action which has already been taken at the national level to give effect
to the obligations that derive from EU (secondary) law. Therefore, the limited
scope of application of EU fundamental rights also aims to limit the creation
of any new (legislative) fundamental rights obligations.
Further it must be noted that the CFR specifically precludes positive action
to be taken on the basis of the rights in the CFR that would classify as ‘prin-
ciples’. A particular distinction has been made in Article 52(5) between ‘rights’
and ‘principles’. The distinction affects the justiciability of the particular provi-
sions containing principles before the EU courts. In the explanations relating
to the CFR it is stated in respect of Article 52(5) that these principles ‘do not
give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union institutions or Member
States authorities.’ It is therefore of particular importance to be careful with
respect to the interpretation and application of principles. Unfortunately, it is
still far from clear which provisions of the CFR actually contain such prin-
ciples’.49 Since it does not seem to relate to the rights which will be discussed
further on in this article, the implications of this provision will not be examined
any further in this article.
The following subsections will therefore specifically discuss to what extent
the development by the CJEU of the obligations giving rise to judicial, admin-
istrative and legislative powers respectively, can be regarded as problematic on
the basis of the limits laid down in Article 51 CFR.
See further D. Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts,
and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection’, Common Market Law Review 50
47
(2013), p. 1267-1304; X. Groussot, L. Pech & G.T. Petursson, ‘The Reach of EU Fundamental
Rights on EU Member States Action after Lisbon’, in: S. de Vries, U. Bernitz & S. Weatherill
(eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights After Lisbon (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013), p. 97-
118.
See CJEU 26 February 2014, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, par. 21; and more recently CJEU
6 March 2014, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, par. 24-25 and 31-32.
48
Recently in the case of Glatzel, for the first time the CJEU clarified that Art. 26 on the integration
of persons with disabilities, concerns a principle instead of a right, see CJEU 22 May 2014,
49
Case C-356/12, Glatzel, par. 77-78. See further on the limitations of the CFR, K. Lenaerts, ‘Ex-
ploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, European Constitutional Law
Review 8 (2012), p. 375-403.
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4.1 Judicial Remedies and Powers
In order to fulfil the requirements which have been defined
by the CJEU in its case law, on the basis of the principle of effective judicial
protection, Member States have had to make changes to national procedural
law. This causes a certain tension in view of the autonomous power of the
Member States in this area.50 Where secondary EU law does not provide for
any specific arrangements concerning the judicial protection and enforcement
of EU law at national level, discretion is in principle left to the Member States
to apply their own procedural rules.51 Scholars have therefore often raised con-
cerns over the, at times, intrusive interference by the CJEU in respect to the
development of judicial remedies and powers which Member States must dis-
pose of to protect EU law.52
To a certain extent, this could be compared to the development of procedural
positive obligations in the case law of the ECrtHR.53 The ECrtHR has extended
states’ obligations to guarantee judicial remedies beyond the areas defined by
Article 6 ECHR (civil and criminal law) and into the realm of certain adminis-
trative areas.54 By doing so, the ECrtHR interfered with Member States powers
and caused some legal uncertainty over the obligations which states could incur
under the ECHR. At the same time, under EU law, there is a much clearer basis
for requiring Member States to introduce judicial remedies to protect EU law.55
Article 47 CFR clearly requires the provision of a judicial remedy in respect to
violations of the rights and freedoms which are guaranteed under EU law, as
However it may be discussed whether Member States’ procedural powers can indeed still be
regarded as ‘autonomous’, cf. W. van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’, Common
50
Market Law Review 37 (2000), p. 501-502; and M. Bobek, ‘Why there is no principle of “proce-
dural autonomy” of the Member States’ in: B. De Witte & H. Mecklitz (eds), The European
Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Antwerp: Intersentia 2011), p. 305-322.
See CJEU 16 December 1976, Case C-33/76, Rewe, par. 5. Cf. the critical evaluation of the de-
velopment of procedural standards by AG Warner in his Opinion to Case C-265/78, Ferwerda,
51
delivered on 27 September 1979. Cf. Prechal & Widdershoven (2011), p. 40-41; and Cleynen-
breugel (2012), supra n. 27 p. 88-89.
See e.g. Prechal & Widdershoven (2011), supra n. 27.52
See further E. Brems, ‘Procedural Protection. An examination of procedural safeguards read
into substantive Convention rights’ in Brems and Gerards, supra n. 17.
53
See e.g. ECrtHR 23 October 1985, appl. no. 8848/80, Benthem; and ECrtHR 6 November 2011,
appl. no. 47335/06, Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, par. 42-43 (on the protection of individuals
54
against dismissals which are solely motivated by an individual’s affiliation against a political
party).
Cf. Cleynenbreugel (2012), supra n. 27, p. 94-95. While concerns continuously arise in respect
of the limited standing rights for challenging act of the EU institutions directly before the CJEU
55
on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU, there seems limited scope for the CJEU to provide a further
going protection on the basis of fundamental rights as the explanatory memorandum to the
CFR specifically states in respect of Art. 47 that it is not intended to change the system of judicial
review as laid down by EU law, and especially not the system of judicial review as against the
acts of the Union institutions.
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well as other guarantees including the right to legal aid.56 Moreover, Article
19(1) TEU which requires Member States to provide for sufficient remedies in
the fields covered by EU law provides an additional, and arguably quite strong,
basis for imposing certain procedural obligations on the Member States.57 Before
the Treaty of Lisbon, the CJEU needed to resort to the general principle of ef-
fective judicial protection which was judge-made, and the requirement of the
principle of loyal cooperation that very generally requires Member States to
take measures to fulfil the obligations arising from EU law (Art. 4(3) TEU);
these constitute arguably much weaker bases than is now seen in EU primary
law.58 If the CJEU would require Member States to fulfil certain procedural
obligations, this does not seem to be in direct conflict with Article 51 CFR taking
into account the stronger bases now laid down in EU primary law.
Still, the CJEU must be careful when indicating what particular remedies
need to be made available and which powers national courts must dispose of.
Member States still retain their discretionary powers in the area of procedural
law.59 In a different scenario, which seems more respectful of national proce-
dural autonomy, the CJEU could, rather than imposing obligations on the
Member States, merely declare that the arrangements which were made at the
national level are incompatible with EU law. Thereby leaving it to the discretion
of the Member States to provide for particular arrangements which are compat-
ible. Yet, that could seem unsatisfactorily when national courts may want more
clear answers from the CJEU, or if a more uniform interpretation of EU law is
required.
In some respects, it has moreover appeared that legislative changes need to
be made in order to comply with the procedural obligations laid down in the
case law of the CJEU. This would then raise a rather direct conflict with Article
51(2) CFR. In the particular circumstances of the Factortame and Unibet cases,
it appeared that legislative modifications needed to be made to directly ensure
that interim measures could be provided for under a generally very complex
set of rules at the national level, which governed the procedural rules of the
Member States.60
Art. 47 CFR was even relied upon before the CFR itself became binding, see CJEU 13 March
2007, Case C-432/05, Unibet, par. 37.
56
See CJEU 17 September 2014, Case C-562/12, Liivimaa Lihaveis, par. 68.57
See further J.T. Lang, ‘The development by the court of justice of the duties of cooperation of
national authorities and community institutions under Article 10 EC’, Fordham International
58
Law Journal 31 (2008), p. 1483-1532. Moreover, the principle of supremacy of EU law which re-
quires that national law incompatible with EU law must be set aside has been used as a basis
for the imposition of procedural obligations, see CJEU 19 June 1990, Case C-213/89, Factortame,
par. 19-21. Cf. CJEU 9 March 1987, Case C-106/77, Simmenthal, par. 21.
Cf. Bobek (2011), supra n. 50.59
This has been illustrated by Cleynenbreugel (2012), supra n. 27, also in respect of CJEU
18 October 2011, Joined Cases 128/09 to C-135/09, Boxus and others.
60
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Also, while Member States may expect to incur obligations in relation to the
principle of effective judicial protection, the particular approach of the CJEU
in the field of national procedural rules has been criticised for its lack of predict-
ability.61 The CJEU sometimes uses the more relaxed standards of equivalence
and effectiveness, but equally sometimes resorts to the more stringent standard
of the principle of effective judicial protection, or even sometimes combines
the standards.62 Moreover, the underlying relationships and rationales are not
always very clear. The principles of effectiveness and equivalence in the CJEU
case law seem to express that the Member States are allowed a certain discretion
to comply with their obligations under EU law. On several occasions the CJEU
has also clearly stressed that generally the creation of new remedies to comply
with the principle of effective judicial protection is not necessary.63 Yet the CJEU
has at times indeed required new remedies to be created.64 Increasingly, perhaps
for that reason, national courts have raised questions concerning the require-
ments of EU law as regards the protection of the principle of effective judicial
protection. Therefore, there is a certain amount of uncertainty over what obli-
gations the Member States can expect to incur under EU law.
4.2 Administrative Obligations
In contrast to judicial remedies, the legal basis for imposing
procedural obligations on the administrative authorities has been considerably
less clear. The CFR actually seems to have created more uncertainty. Initially,
the right to be heard and the obligation to motivate decisions were established
by the CJEU on the basis of the rights of defence which was (and still is) guar-
anteed as a general principle of EU law. Now, however, the CFR guarantees
such obligations as part of the right to good administration in Article 41. Yet,
this provision is only addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
of the EU.65 In recent years many questions have been raised by national courts
as to whether national administrative authorities incur obligations to hear and
provide motivations in different areas where EU law may be applicable.66 In a
See in particular Prechal and Widdershoven (2012), supra n. 27.61
See in particular Prechal and Widdershoven (2011), supra n. 27.62
See CJEU 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05, Unibet, par. 40.63
See European Commission report 14 April 2014, Fundamental Rights: Importance of the EU
Charter grows as citizens stand to benefit, IP/14/422, p. 6.
64
It is moreover questioned whether this provision included indeed subjective rights or whether
it also includes principles within the meaning of Art. 52(5) CFR, see H.C.C. Hofman &
65
B.C. Mihaescu, ‘The relationship between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten
General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’, European Constitutional
Law Review 9 (2013), p. 88 and further.
European Commission report 14 April 2014, Fundamental Rights: Importance of the EU Charter
grows as citizens stand to benefit, IP/14/422, p. 6.
66
Review of European Administrative Law 2015-2140
BEIJER
line of cases, the CJEU has explained that the principles of good administration
were indeed to be respected by the Member States. Though initially it did not
explain whether such actions would need to be taken on the basis of Article
41.67 The CJEU has only more recently established that Article 41 of the CFR
indeed only applies to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU,
while the principles of good administration must still be respected by the
Member States but only on the basis of the general principles of EU law.68 The
CJEU has thus now brought more clarity in this regard.69
In this context, the same principle of national procedural autonomy must
be respected by the CJEU.70 The CJEU may therefore not impose very specific
requirements on the national authorities. In most cases, the CJEU appears to
remain deferential to national authorities by primarily relying on the principles
of equivalence and effectiveness. Interestingly, in the cases of Mukarubega and
Boudjila, the CJEU went a bit further.71 These cases concerned illegally-staying
third-country nationals, which had been heard by the domestic authorities in
respect to the decision on the lawfulness of their stay, but not on their return
decisions. The CJEU was asked to clarify how the rights of defence would have
to be fulfilled. The CJEU clarified that where the return decision had not been
directly related to the decision to refuse a residence permit (Mukarubega) or the
third-country national could not reasonably suspect what evidence might be
relied upon against him (Boudjlida), Member States may need to hear those
individuals again.72 Although in both cases the CJEU concluded that an addi-
tional hearing was not necessary, the detailed requirements that it provided
may still interfere to some extent with the powers of the Member States at the
national level. Also, it could be considered problematic that in Mukarubega, the
CJEU expressly required Member States to lay down in national law the obliga-
tion to leave the national territory in the case of an illegal stay, while this legis-
lative obligation was not provided for under the applicable Directive itself.73
Cf. CJEU 22 November 2012, Case C-277/11, M., par. 81 and ff; CJEU 10 September 2013, Case
C-383/13, M.G. and N.R., par. 32; CJEU 8 May 2014, Case C-604/12, H.N., par. 49; and CJEU
3 July 2014, Case C-129/13, Kamino International Logistics, par. 28.
67
See CJEU 17 July 2014, Case C-141/12, YS and Others, par. 67; and CJEU 5 November 2014, Case
C-166/13, Mukarubega, par. 45; and CJEU 11 December 2014, Case C-249/13, Boudjlida, par. 34.
68
This has also clarified that fundamental rights may still need to be protected as general principles
of EU law, as is also in accordance with Art. 6(3) TEU.
69
Cf. CJEU 10 September 2013, Case C-383/13, M.G. and N.R, par. 35; CJEU 8 May 2014, Case
C-604/12, H.N., par. 41; and CJEU 5 November 2014, Case C-166/13, Mukarubega, par. 51; and
CJEU 11 December 2014, Case C-249/13, Boudjlida, par. 41.
70
CJEU 5 November 2014, Case C-166/13, Mukarubega; and CJEU 11 December 2014, Case
C-249/13, Boudjlida.
71
CJEU 5 November 2014, Case C-166/13, Mukarubega, par. 62; and CJEU 11 December 2014,
Case C-249/13, Boudjlida, par. 56.
72
CJEU 5 November 2014, Case C-166/13, Mukarubega, par. 62.73
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The requirements that need to be fulfilled by administrative authorities, i.e.
to hear individuals before taking decisions that would adversely affect their in-
terests and to motivate those decisions, could create additional burdens at the
national level. Therefore, these obligations may be received critically. Concerns
would especially arise when obligations are financially burdensome. Such obli-
gations were formulated, by the CJEU, in the case of Abdida. In that particular
case, the CJEU clarified that Member States would have to provide for the basic
needs of a third-country national, during the appeal of a return decision, who
is seriously ill and lacks the means to provide for themselves.74 In comparison,
the applicable Returns Directive itself had only required Member States to en-
sure, as far as possible, that emergency health care and essential treatment of
illnesses were provided for. According to the CJEU, however, the respective
provision of the Directive would be rendered meaningless if basic needs were
not provided for as well. The CJEU expressly rendered its judgment in light of
the non-refoulement principle and relevant case law of the ECrtHR.75 The creation
of such financial obligations may warrant a very careful approach, as the estab-
lishment of such obligations, on the basis of fundamental rights in the case
law of the ECrtHR, has, for obvious reasons, appeared very problematic.76
Mindful thereof, the CJEU has decided to apply a far more restrictive approach,
in other cases, concerning financial obligations that may be required to ensure
the protection of certain fundamental rights.77
4.3 Legislative Obligations
In general, the creation of any legislative obligations to ensure
the protection of fundamental rights may not be expected, due to the clear
limitations that relate to the principle of attributed powers and to Article 51
CFR.78 The formulation by the CJEU of legislative obligations in the case of
Chatzi has therefore met with criticism.79 In that case, the CJEU required that
CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 59-62.74
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 52; and cf. ECrtHR 26 April 2007,
appl. no. 25389/05, Gebremedhin v. France, par. 67; and ECrtHR 23 February 2012, appl. no.
27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, par. 200. See further section 5 of this article.
75
See e.g. ECrtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland (on the right to provide
for free legal aid).
76
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-542/13, M’Bodj, par. 41. For a brief discussion, see section
5 of this article.
77
Yet the requirement to set aside national laws in cases such as Mangold and Kücükdeveci may
be regarded as problematic as well on the basis of the principle of attributed powers. See CJEU
78
22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold, par. 77; CJEU 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07,
Kücükdeveci, par. 51; and cf. Prechal (2000), supra n. 27, p. 16-19.
See E. Muir, ‘The ECJ: a fundamental rights institution among others’ in: M. Dawson, B. de
Witte & E. Muir (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar 2013), p. 89-90.
79
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a national parental leave regime takes into account the specific needs of parents
of twins.80 The CJEU established this requirement on the basis of the principle
of equal treatment, which is protected as a general principle of EU law and by
Article 20 CFR. Meanwhile, EU law itself, under the Parental Leave Directive,
had only actually provided for a minimum requirement of parental leave of
three months.81 Here, it is uncertain whether any further actions that may need
to be taken still fall within the scope of EU law. The wide scope of application
of fundamental rights in respect of national measures has more generally ap-
peared to be somewhat of a challenge. It has become clear that Member States
must respect EU fundamental rights when they have broad discretion in the
implementation of EU law, and in respect of national legislation which was not
as such adopted with a view to the implementation of EU law.82 Also, there re-
mains a certain amount of uncertainty over the scope of application of the CFR
and the general principles of EU law. The CJEU generally only explains on a
case-by-case basis whether the particular situation falls within the scope of EU
law. Only more recently, has the CJEU provided some further criteria to deter-
mine when fundamental rights apply to national measures.83 In several cases,
the CJEU has indeed made it very clear that the protection of fundamental rights
by the EU is not intended to extend the competences of the EU, as defined by
the Treaties, and has declared various issues to fall outside the scope of applica-
tion of the CFR.84
It appears especially problematic in the case of Chatzi for the CJEU to discuss
in quite some detail which measures Member States could take to actually ensure
the protection of the equal treatment principle in relation to parental leave for
twins. The CJEU admitted that the national legislature retained a ‘wide freedom
of action’.85 Yet, it also further clarified that member states could choose to ex-
tend the period for parental leave, to organise flexible ways of work, and provide
material assistance, such as a right of access to childcare centres or financial
aid.86 The measures which Member States would take beyond the Parental
Leave Directive have been considered to constitute more extensive protection
which falls within the competences of the Member States. In this specific regard,
See CJEU 16 September 2010, Case C-149/10, Chatzi, par. 75.80
Clause 2(1) of the annex to Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework
agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1996 L 145/24.
81
Cf. CJEU 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others; and CJEU
22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold. See further Sarmiento (2013), and Groussot,
Pech & Petursson (2013), supra n. 47.
82
Cf. CJEU 6 March 2014, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, par. 24-25 and 31-32.83
See e.g. CJEU 11 November 2014, Case C-333/13, Dano, par. 88.84
See CJEU 16 September 2010, C-149/10, Chatzi, par. 71.85
See CJEU 16 September 2010, C-149/10, Chatzi, par. 72-73.86
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the approach of the CJEU in Chatzi is considered in conflict with the principle
of attributed powers.87
In comparison, the case law of the ECrtHR contains many more examples
of positive obligations to adopt legislation to ensure fundamental rights protec-
tion. Although the ECrtHR also aims to be very careful as to not interfere in
states’ legislative powers.88 However, The division of legislative powers between
the EU and the Member States is generally of much greater concern.
4.4 Summing up the Main Challenges for the Effective
Protection of Fundamental Rights by the CJEU
The foregoing sections have discussed that there is indeed a
certain basis in EU law that allows the CJEU to impose certain procedural as
well as material obligations on the Member States to ensure the effective pro-
tection of rights. This includes the right to effective judicial review, to good
administration, and the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of tor-
ture, inhuman or degrading treatment. In the development of such obligations,
by the CJEU, there does not appear to be a direct conflict with Article 51 CFR,
unless it appears that Member States incur new legislative obligations or legis-
lative obligations which fall outside the scope of EU law. For the most part, the
procedural as well as material fundamental rights obligations can be founded,
in some part, on the basis of secondary EU law in combination with provisions
of the CFR.
The development of positive obligations, by the CJEU, appears to particularly
raise concern if the CJEU interferes too much with the choices that can be made
at national level in order to comply with EU law. It has been regarded as partic-
ularly problematic where the CJEU has specified, in quite some detail, how the
right to an effective judicial remedy and the right to good administration would
have to be protected at national level for the Member States still enjoy discretion
on the basis of the principle of national procedural autonomy. If such obligations
impose organisational or financial burdens on the Member States, this may
raise concern considering that the development of positive obligations in the
case law of the ECrtHR has been criticised particularly on that account.
The other main concern seems to be that there is a certain amount of legal
uncertainty over the obligations which Member States could incur on the basis
of fundamental rights. This could partly be explained by the fact that there may
See M. de Mol, ‘Het toepassingsgebied van Unierechtelijke grondrechten & het beginsel van
de allocatie van bevoegdheden [The scope of application of EU fundamental rights and the
87
principle of allocation of competences]’, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2012/6,
p. 27-28.
See e.g. ECrtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium; and ECrtHR 11 July 2002,
appl. no. 28957/95, Case of Christina Goodwin v. the United Kingdom.
88
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be certain gaps in EU legislation or that it contains vaguely formulated provi-
sions. However, the requirements of fundamental rights protection may also
only be revealed in very concrete circumstances. The CJEU may be expected to
deal with such questions and to make some difficult choices, especially if the
national courts would ask for even further guidance. At the same time, the
CJEU itself also contributes to some extent to the legal uncertainty by mixing
up the deferential and the more intrusive approaches in its case law, concerning
the requirements of (procedural) fundamental rights protection.
5 Principles for Determining and Limiting the Scope
of Positive Obligations
How could the CJEU deal with the foregoing criticism that
could, and has been raised, with regard to the development of positive obligations
on the basis of fundamental rights? The case law of the ECrtHR, which may
arguably include some much further reaching positive obligations for states
than the CJEU could (ever) develop, may provide inspiration for the CJEU. In
this section, several relevant principles which have been formulated in the case
law of the ECrtHR will be discussed and subsequently applied to some of the
cases which have been brought before the CJEU.
Firstly, in dealing with concerns over the division of competences between
the EU and the Member States, the CJEU may want to take into account that
the ECrtHR generally grants Member States a wide margin of appreciation in
fulfilling positive obligations; this is often made known in the judgments of
the ECrtHR.89 Fundamental rights provisions are naturally phrased very broadly
and therefore generally leave choices to be made with regard to the measures
that can be taken. As a supranational authority, the ECrtHR, as well as the
CJEU, may not be in the best position to decide on a particular form of protection
at the national level. Therefore, the CJEU may want to adopt an approach where
it expressly makes clear that it indeed grants Member States discretion in
finding appropriate measures at the national level to comply with the funda-
mental rights obligations that need to be fulfilled on the basis of EU law. At the
same time, the CJEU may be required to provide quite clear indications as to
the obligations which Member States need to fulfil, since national courts
sometimes refer very specific questions to the CJEU, or rather because the
CJEU may itself want to secure a uniform interpretation of EU law in certain
fields (for example if they are exhaustively regulated by EU law). If so, the CJEU
could decide to prescribe clearer indications as to the particular measures it
See e.g. ECrtHR 19 February 1998, appl. no. 22729/93, Kaya v. Turkey, par. 106.89
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requires Member States to take, and it could carefully explain such an approach.
Secondly, in dealing with concerns over the burdens that may be imposed
on Member States in securing fundamental rights protection, the CJEU may
especially want to take into consideration the limitations which generally apply
to the scope of positive obligations. The ECrtHR generally does not require
states to incur ‘impossible or disproportionate burdens’ in the protection of
fundamental rights.90 Positive obligations are in principle obligations of conduct
rather than of result. The ECrtHR understands that the effective protection of
fundamental rights may give rise to measures which have financial implications,
especially where social and economic measures need to be taken. There is ob-
viously a limit to what states can achieve. The ECrtHR has acknowledged this
by requiring states (only) to take ‘reasonable measures’.91 States parties must
actually dispose of the organisational and financial means to provide for effective
protection.92 Furthermore, the ECrtHR only accepts positive obligations when
public authorities (ought to) have knowledge of the infringement of the funda-
mental rights of certain (groups of) individuals and their causes.93
By clarifying the methodological choices in developing its positive obligations
and by granting states discretion in fulfilling their obligations, as well as by
imposing limitations to the scope of positive obligations the ECrtHR creates a
certain amount of legal certainty and foreseeability that may help these obliga-
tions to be accepted.94This may be a reason for the CJEU to provide greater
clarity as to the choices that it makes in fundamental rights cases. Therefore,
it would perhaps help the CJEU to depart from its judicial style which has been
characterised by De Búrca as ‘self-referential, formulaic and often minima-
listic’.95
The ECrtHR has even expressed that the scope of states’ positive obligations is inherently
limited under the Convention, see e.g. ECrtHR, admissibility decision of 14 May 2002, no.
38621/97, Case of Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic.
90
See e.g. ECrtHR 20 March 2008, appl. nos. 15339/02 to 15343/02, Budayeva and Others v.
Russia, par. 175; and ECrtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 16798/80, López Ostra v. Spain,
par. 51.
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See Xenos (2012), supra n. 2, p. 100-107.92
According to Xenos, states have knowledge of fundamental rights infringements inter alia in
contexts where it is evident that fundamental rights infringements take place (e.g. in hazardous
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industries or health care), where (scientific) reports have been presented regarding fundamental
rights infringements, and where complaints have been brought to the attention of the state,
see Xenos (2012), supra n. 2, p. 82-91.
In finding out whether active measures to protect fundamental rights can be accepted, the
ECrtHR generally adopts a fair balance test which implies that the interests of the individual
94
to the protection of a particular fundamental right are weighed against the general interests
and the interests of the Community, see e.g. See e.g. ECrtHR 17 October 1986, appl. no. 9532/81,
Rees v. the United Kingdom, par. 37.
G. de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human
Rights Adjudicator?’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20 (2013), p. 168-184.
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In some areas where it may appear difficult to ensure an effective protection
of fundamental rights, the CJEU may thus want to take the foregoing principles
into account. The recent remarks of the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 as to the protection
of fundamental rights by the Member States in areas governed by the principle
of mutual trust – which were also briefly discussed in the introduction – has
raised some concerns.96 The CJEU seems to have provided very little room for
the Member States to check whether other Member States have observed fun-
damental rights in the areas of asylum, criminal and civil law in which they
must cooperate on the basis of the principle of mutual trust. It is of importance
to examine the case law of the ECrtHR here in more detail as it has rather
carefully formulated when and what type of positive obligations the Member
States would need to fulfil to comply with their obligations under the ECHR.97
The ECrtHR has established that there must be a minimum level of severity
for complaints to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR.98 In M.S.S. the ECrtHR
clearly decided that this threshold had been reached and that states parties were
precluded from sending asylum seekers to Greece as substantial grounds had
been shown that there was a serious risk of treatment contrary to Article 3
ECHR. However, the ECrtHR has not reached the same conclusion in respect
of other states parties within the EU.99 In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, for example,
the ECrtHR emphasised that ‘the current situation in Italy can in no way be
compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. judgment’.100 In
addition, the ECrtHR, in principle, requires applicants to advance arguments
if they consider that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person
concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Most relevant to the states then is that the ECrtHR
concluded in M.S.S. that a state has to know or at least ought to have known
that asylum seekers were at serious risk of violations under Article 3 ECHR on
account of the numerous reports available concerning the general situation for
asylum seekers in Greece. The ECrtHR has clarified in subsequent cases,
dealing with the Dublin Regulation, that information provided for and the letters
See also L. Storgaard, ‘EU Lw Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection –
On Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR’, Human Rights Law Review 15 (2015), p. 507-
510.
96
Cf. Stubberfield (2012), supra n. 3, p. 133-140.97
The ECrtHR has used this particular limitation also to narrow down the scope of the protection
for environmental claims on the basis of Art. 8 ECHR, arguably so as to avoid a flood of claims
98
in the area of environmental protection, see ECrtHR, judgment of 9 June 2005, no. 55723/00,
Case of Fadeyeva v. Russia, par. 70.
See ECrtHR 2 April 2013, no. 27725/10 (admissibility decision), Mohammed Hussein v. the
Netherlands and Italy (return to Italy); ECrtHR 6 June 2013, no. 2283/12, Mohammed v. Austria;
and ECrtHR 3 July 2014, appl. no. 71932/12, Mohammadi v. Austria (returns to Hungary).
99
See ECrtHR 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, par. 114.100
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sent by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) to the
Member States have been of importance in determining from which point in
time Member States were considered to know of the violations and were thus
precluded from sending asylum seekers back to Greece.101 Thus it appears that
the ECrtHR only requires states to take reasonable measures. However, in its
judgment of Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the ECrtHR required a more pro-active
approach by the Member States, though on an exceptional basis. The ECrtHR
was concerned with the transfer of a family including children who must receive
particular protection due to ‘their specific needs and extreme vulnerability’.102
It therefore imposed an obligation on the Swiss authorities to obtain insurances
from the public authorities that upon arrival in Italy the applicants would receive
facilities and conditions which are adapted to the age of children and that the
family is kept together.
Knowing this, perhaps there is room to clarify the positive obligations which
the Member States need to fulfil. By specifically indicating when obligations
arise for the Member States, as well as indicating the limits which are related
to the fulfilment of such obligations, the CJEU could create legal certainty, and
therefore prevent a conflict between the obligations that derive from EU law
and from the ECHR.103
The CJEU could also choose to refer to particular judgments of the ECrtHR
in its case law to legitimise the development of certain positive obligations
within EU law. This would also ensure necessary consistency with respect to
the meaning and scope of the fundamental rights as they are laid down in the
ECHR. Though the CJEU may also provide further protection on the basis of
Article 52(3) CFR.104 There have already been several interesting examples where
the CJEU directly referred to specific judgments of the ECrtHR to further justify
certain positive obligations.105
In two recent judgments, the CJEU seems to have shown more awareness
of the implications flowing from certain positive obligations. In the case of
Abdida, the CJEU has expressly referred to the ECrtHR cases of Gebremedhin
v. France and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy to justify the imposition of an ob-
ligation on national courts to order interim measures. The CJEU also referred
See ECrtHR 7 March 2000, no. 43844/98, T.I. v. The United Kingdom; ECrtHR 2 December
2008, no. 32733/08, K.R.S.; ECrtHR 5 December 2013, no. 60104/08, Sharifi v. Austria; and
ECrtHR 7 May 2014, no. 44689/09, Safaii v. Austria.
101
ECrtHR 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, par. 119.102
Stubberfield (2012), supra n. 3, p. 117.103
See further De Búrca (2013), supra n. 95.104
For example, in Gascogne the CJEU expressly referred to the case of Kudla v. Poland of the
ECrtHR to introduce a new remedy before the General Court in relation to a violation of the
105
requirement of a judicial remedy within a reasonable time, cf. CJEU 26 November 2013, Case
C-58/12 P, Group Gascogne v. Commission, par. 83; and cf. ECrtHR 26 October 2000, appl. no.
30210/96, Kudla v. Poland.
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to the case of N. v. The United Kingdom which arguably informed it decision to
require basic needs to be provided by member states to third-country nationals
who are suffering from a serious illness when awaiting the appeal to the decision
to return.106 The CJEU also stressed that ‘it is for the Member States to determine
the form in which such provision for basic needs of the third-country national
is made.’107 The CJEU particularly made sure that such interpretation was to
be provided in relation to the provisions of the Returns Directive 2008/115, even
though the referring court had not specifically asked questions concerning that
Directive. In another recent judgment, in the case of M’Bodj, the CJEU expressly
clarified that the interpretation that the ECrtHR had provided concerning Article
3 ECHR in the case of N. v. The United Kingdom could not be applied to deter-
mine whether a third-country national who suffers from a serious illness would
have to receive subsidiary protection under international law on the basis of
the Qualifications Directive.108 The CJEU clearly explains that such protection
does not fall under the minimum standards which must be guaranteed by that
Directive, and that the Member States may neither provide such protection by
providing a higher level of protection.109 It would, according to the CJEU, not
comply with the rationale of international protection. Instead it clarified that
Member States could (still) use their discretionary powers to provide protection
for humanitarian or compassionate reasons.
These cases demonstrate that the CJEU is sometimes willing to provide
much more clarity with regard to the obligations that Member States may incur
in relation to the rights laid down in EU legislation. Yet, at the same time the
CJEU expresses some clear limits as to the scope of such obligations which
could be read into EU law.
6 Conclusion
The CJEU may need to start considering more generally how
it deals with the concept of positive obligations. This article has discussed a
range of examples, in the case law of the CJEU, which have led to positive obli-
gations that must be fulfilled by the Member States on the basis of fundamental
rights. The CJEU has especially defined several procedural-type obligations,
but also some material obligations on the basis of the principle of effective ju-
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 47 and 52. Cf ECrtHR 26 April 2007,
appl. no. 25389/05, Gebremedhin v. France, par. 67; ECrtHR 23 February 2012, appl. no.
106
27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, par. 200; and ECrtHR 27 May 2008, no. 26565/05,
N. v. the United Kingdom, par. 42.
CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, par. 61.107
See CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-542/13, M’Bodj.108
CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-542/13, M’Bodj, par. 39-42.109
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dicial protection, the right to good administration and the principle of non-re-
foulement. National courts are increasingly asking more specific questions about
the obligations that may be derived from fundamental rights within the scope
of EU law. An individual rights-based approach may allow the CJEU to impose
positive obligations directly, as such obligations are necessary to ensure the ef-
fective protection of fundamental rights. Then, however, it may want to rely on
some specific principles which have been developed in the ECrtHR case law
and justify the particular choices it makes. The development of positive obliga-
tions can impose additional burdens on the Member States, sometimes requiring
legislative changes to be made, and it may especially create a certain tension in
respect to the division of powers between the EU and the Member States. The
CJEU must respect the limits of its own fundamental rights review, as well as
the limits which relate to the protection of fundamental rights in general. It
must be taken into account that states are generally granted a broad discretion
when fulfilling positive obligations. There are generally alternative measures
available at the national level; therefore, supranational authorities may not be
in the best position to make specific choices as to the measures to be taken.
Moreover, positive obligations generally concern obligations of conduct and
not obligations of result. Therefore, positive obligations may inter alia only give
rise to ‘reasonable measures’ and may only arise where there is knowledge of
fundamental rights infringements. The CJEU could expressly recognise such
limits in areas where the acceptance of such obligations is feared to be problem-
atic, such as in the area of asylum law.
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